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Do Physicians Respond to Liability Standards? 
 
by 
 
Michael Frakes, Matthew Frank and Seth Seabury 
In this paper, we explore the sensitivity in the clinical decisions of physicians to the 
standards of care expected of them under the law, drawing on the abandonment by 
states over time of rules holding physicians to standards determined by local 
customs and the contemporaneous adoption of national-standard rules.  Using data 
on broad rates of surgical interventions at the county-by-year level from the Area 
Resource File, we find that local surgery rates converge towards national surgery 
rates upon the adoption of national-standard rules.  Moreover, we find that these 
effects are more pronounced among rural counties. (JEL: I10, K13, K41) 
1 Introduction 
The standard of care arguably constitutes the bedrock of tort law.  In most tortious 
contexts, including medical malpractice, actors are not liable for the harms that 
they cause to the extent that they have taken the level of care that the law expects 
of them.  As stated long ago by Oliver Wendell Holmes, the imposition of an 
objective standard of care under tort law has the potential to redirect the behavior 
of those individuals otherwise inclined to operate at levels of care in contradiction 
with such standards (Holmes 1881).  Defining what this standard is and discussing 
how it is established is an exercise that occupies a substantial portion of a typical 
first-year Torts course and that has received considerable attention in tort theory 
(Shavell 2004).  Yet, despite all of this classroom and theoretical attention, the 
empirical tort literature to date has paid little attention to this crucial component of 
the law.  Instead, this literature has viewed the substance of the law in relatively 
abstract terms and has simply identified the effects of tort law by focusing on 
variations along the remedy dimension.  For instance, in the medical context—
where our focus will lie in this paper—many studies have attempted to isolate the 
influence of medical malpractice law by estimating physician responses to the 
adoption of caps on non-economic damage awards or to similar reforms that 
largely operate by curbing the expected amount of damages that plaintiffs may 
recover in the event of liability (Kessler and McClellan 1996, Currie and 
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MacLeod 2008).  Such reforms do not directly alter what is expected of 
physicians; they simply diminish the harms associated with any deviation from 
those legal expectations.  In this paper, we begin to fill these gaps in the empirical 
literature by asking instead how physician decisionmaking may change when we 
alter the standards to which physicians are held in the first place.   
To be sure, remedies are a critical component to the deterrent channel of the 
law and our analysis does not undercut the merits of the remedy-focused 
approaches taken by others to date.  Such studies indeed provide useful 
information.  We simply note that this traditional approach cannot answer all of 
the questions that we may have regarding the effects of malpractice law.  For 
instance, investigations into the effects of damage caps may do little to illuminate 
the projected impacts of next-generation malpractice reforms that are often 
discussed in the policy sphere and that focus more on altering the way in which 
physicians are substantively evaluated—e.g., extending definitive safe harbors to 
physicians who comply with established clinical practice guidelines.  In order to 
shed light on the possible impacts of reforms that operate along this more 
substantive dimension to the law, it is important to conduct independent 
investigations into the sensitivity of physicians to the standards of care to which 
they are held.   
To demonstrate the limitations that may come from simply relying on 
investigations into the penalty / remedial dimension of the law, let us turn briefly 
to an analogy in criminal law.  That is, consider the case of legally imposed speed 
limits.  Remedies are clearly critical to the effectiveness of such rules.  After all, 
for speed limits to have any hope of regulating driving behavior, one must receive 
a penalty to the extent the limit is violated.  With this in mind, policymakers may 
modify penalty levels in order to alter the behavior of drivers.  Any attempt to 
understand fully the link between driving regulations and driving behavior, 
however, would be challenged to the extent one only observes what happens when 
penalties are changed in this manner. Consider a hypothetical road on which 
drivers may only desire to drive 35 miles per hour (criminal forces aside), given 
the particular characteristics of the road and given drivers’ tolerance for risk.  
Imposing a 35 mile per hour speed limit on this road may not alter behavior 
significantly beyond this baseline.  After all, drivers would continue to drive at the 
preferred 35 miles per hour.  In this event, any increase or reduction in fines at 
this speed limit may not alter behavior as well.  Any observed insensitivity to 
speed limit penalties in this case does not mean, however, that such drivers are 
universally unresponsive to speed-limit laws.  If this jurisdiction were to instead 
lower the speed-limit on this road to 25 miles per hour, it is indeed quite possible 
that some drivers would adjust their inherent desire to drive 35 miles per hour and 
instead drive closer to the newly imposed limit.  But we would never know the 
full picture here without studying both what happens when jurisdictions modify 
speed limit penalties and what happens when they modify speed limits 
themselves.   
This speed limit hypothetical is indeed quite analogous to the case of medical 
malpractice law in the United States.  In the above hypothetical, the speed limit 
was set at a point at which drivers already preferred to operate, leaving little 
independent room for the law to push drivers any further (at least on average).  In 
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the case of malpractice law, such an outcome would not simply happen by 
happenstance; rather, standards of care in U.S. tort law are generally structured 
with this outcome precisely in mind.  That is, courts do not generally determine on 
their own the clinical practices that they expect of physicians.  Rather, they have 
deferred this exercise to the medical industry itself and have simply sought to 
define liability standards by asking what physicians customarily do in similar 
situations.  Thus, by imposing that physicians should maintain the practice styles 
that they otherwise already wish to follow on their own, the present malpractice 
system may be doing little independently to redirect physician behavior, at least as 
a first order matter.  Under such a structure, therefore, practices may not change 
substantially upon the adoption of damage caps or related reforms, consistent with 
much of the empirical evidence put forth to date (Frakes 2015).  Nothing in this 
discussion, however, suggests that physicians would be unresponsive to a change 
in the law that held them to a different standard altogether (analogous to the 
reduced speed limit above).  We can only begin to understand the full potential of 
tort law to influence physician behavior once we start paying independent 
attention to the way in which physicians respond to the clinical standards expected 
of them under the law.   
The challenge, of course, comes in capturing variations in the law along the 
standard-of-care dimension, allowing us to glean such an understanding in the 
first place.  Fortunately, as is discussed in most first-year Torts casebooks (for 
example, Farnsworth and Grady 2009), the vast majority of states have 
experienced a reform of this nature.  While states have indeed set medical liability 
standards by deferring to customary industry practices, there has been some 
variation in the law concerning what sets of physicians to look to in identifying 
the operable customs.  Historically, jurisdictions applied what is known as the 
“locality rule,” whereby physicians would be held to a standard of care 
determined by the customary practices of those physicians practicing in the same 
locality, where locality generally entailed smaller regions within states—e.g., the 
nearby town or county.  Early reforms to these rules were procedural in nature and 
facilitated the ability of local plaintiffs to find experts from outside of the 
community to testify as to local customs (to alleviate concerns that physician 
experts would be unwilling to testify against their local peers).  In the latter part of 
the 20th Century, most states (via state supreme court decisions) took a more 
substantive turn with their reforms and abandoned the locality rule entirely in 
favor of rules that simply held physicians to the standards of care determined by 
the customary practices of physicians nationally.1   
These distinctions in liability rules are of particular relevance in light of the 
rampant geographical variations that exist in clinical practice patterns, a 
phenomenon that has been the subject of a massive literature in medicine and 
health economics (Skinner 2011).  In other words, in light of such substantial 
regional variations in practices, this move from a locality rule to a national-
standard rule constitutes a meaningful and substantial change in the clinical 
                                                 
1 Frakes (2013) reviewed both case and statutory law and documented the evolution of each state’s 
malpractice standard-of-care laws from the mid-1970’s to the present.  Table 1 documents this 
legal evolution.  Specifically, the table identifies states that amended their standard-of-care laws—
along the national vs. non-national dimension—during the study period. 
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expectations placed upon physicians.  Different theories have been proffered as to 
why clinical practices in different regions of the country developed along distinct 
pathways. It could be that variations results from physicians operating off of a 
geographically-limited set of information (Wennberg and Gittelsohn 1973). There 
could also be more nuanced, dynamic forces in play in which local conditions in 
one region are such that specialization in one practice style pushes towards heavy 
utilization of that practice style (because of, for example, productivity spillovers), 
even though local conditions in other regions may push towards specialization in a 
different type of practice (Chandra and Staiger 2007).  Regardless of the precise 
cause, medical liability “locality rules” may operate to cement these regionally 
distinct practice styles, either by discouraging physicians from deviating from 
those local customs that have developed or by providing comfort to physicians 
wishing to maintain such customs.     
 
 
Table 1.  Variations in National-Standard Rules (1977-2005) 
State Year Adopted Year Dropped State Year Adopted Year Dropped 
Alabama 1980  Nevada 1979  
Colorado 1983  New Mexico 1978  
Connecticut 1984  Oklahoma 1984  
Delaware 1999  Rhode Island 1998  
D.C. 1980  S. Carolina 1981  
Indiana 1992  South Dakota 1988  
Maryland  1994 West Virginia 1986  
Mississippi 1983  Wyoming 1981  
Montana 1985     
Notes: years of adoption and repeal (if applicable) of laws requiring that physicians follow national (as 
opposed to local) standards of care in malpractice actions.  States are only included if their relevant 
malpractice laws varied within the 1977 – 2005 period.  Source: Frakes (2013).   
 
 
Frakes (2013) showed that the abandonment of such locality rules and the 
adoption of national-standard rules may have broken those isolating forces and led 
to substantial regional convergence in various obstetric, cardiac, and diagnostic 
procedures—i.e., local practices did indeed begin to conform more strongly with 
national practices upon the relevant change in the law.  Frakes (2013) analyzed 
the effects of national-standard adoptions using rich inpatient discharge data, 
which, among other things, facilitated the inclusion of control variables for 
various comorbidities.  Limited to inpatient records, however, Frakes (2013) was 
forced to focus on those types of clinical scenarios—i.e., obstetrics and intensive 
cardiac intervention—in which care is almost exclusively inpatient in nature.  As 
such, it is unclear whether his findings generalize to a broader range of clinical 
settings.  Another limitation with Frakes (2013) is that the geographical scope of 
the analysis is at the state level (given data limitations).  The analysis may have 
validly captured the effects of national-standard adoptions on across-state 
variations in practices; however, given that locality rules operated along sub-state 
dimensions, Frakes (2013) sacrificed the ability to estimate more geographically 
nuanced (and geographically accurate) specifications.   
In this paper, we attempt to fill some of these gaps left by Frakes (2013).  
Using data on overall rates of surgical intervention (inpatient and outpatient) 
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derived from the Area Resource File (ARF), we likewise find that local surgery 
rates converge (both upwards and downwards, as appropriate) in the direction of 
the national mean upon the abandonment of locality rules and contemporaneous 
adoption of national standard rules. While the ARF must sacrifice some of the 
clinical traction afforded by the specifications estimated in Frakes (2013), the 
results nonetheless provide some evidence to suggest that the convergence in 
utilization patterns documented in this prior research generalize to a broader range 
of surgical intervention settings, beyond just obstetrics and cardiac care.  
Accordingly, we build on this prior research in providing even further evidence of 
the empirical relevance of liability standards themselves. 
Moreover, we confront this analysis using data at the county-year level, 
thereby demonstrating that the findings in Frakes (2013) generalize to 
specifications that perhaps better approximate the geographical expansion in 
liability rules stemming from national-standard adoptions.  Taking advantage of 
the county-level data, we also stratify the analysis by the population density of the 
relevant region.  Discussions surrounding the distinctions between locality rules 
and national-standard rules have historically suggested that the divergence in 
outcomes between these rules may be most pronounced in rural communities.  
Perhaps consistent with this general sentiment, we find evidence suggesting that 
the convergence in local surgery rates in the direction of national mean rates is 
strongest when focusing on those regions in the bottom quartile of population 
density.   
The papers proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we discuss the data used and the 
methodology employed to explore the impacts of liability-standard reforms on 
treatment utilization patterns.  In Section 3, we present the results of this analysis.  
Finally, in Section 4, we conclude.   
2 Data and Methodology 
For our analysis, we use data on characteristics of local health care markets 
from the Area Resource File (ARF).2  At the county-by-year level, the ARF 
assimilates information from the Census Bureau, the American Medical 
Association, and the American Hospital Association (AHA), among other sources.  
Critical for our purposes is information stemming from the AHA annual surveys 
on the number of inpatient and outpatient surgeries performed in the relevant 
county during the given year, along with information from the AMA records on 
the number of physicians practicing in the relevant regions.3  With this 
information, we impute the propensity of physicians within a relevant area to 
follow an intensive surgical practice style, as opposed to a non-intensive style 
(analogous to Chandra and Staiger, 2007).  This intensive-versus-non-intensive 
                                                 
2 The ARF is now called the Area Health Resource File (AHRF), but we use data form earlier 
years when it was called the ARF.  For practical purposes the distinction is not important because 
both use(d) the AMA Masterfile for source data.  
3 Surgeries included in this count were performed either in inpatient facilities in the given county 
or in outpatient ambulatory surgery centers in that county that are affiliated with the hospitals in 
the AHA records.    
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decision captures the physician choice inherent in our investigation into the effects 
of liability standards on physician decisionmaking.   
The data spans the 1977-2005 period explored in Frakes (2013).  We use linear 
projections to impute data for missing years in the ARF files.  The ARF also 
includes data on several sources of demographic information relevant for our 
study, including the age and race distribution of states over time (collected from 
the US Census) and average per-capita income, as well as county population 
density and educational attainment rates across various education categories.  In 
addition to the ARF, we use as covariates data on other tort reforms from Ronen 
Avraham’s Database of State Tort Law Reforms (DSTLR), 4th Edition.4  Though 
using data on surgery rates at the county level, we merge in information on 
malpractice standards rules and tort reforms at the state-year level. 
With these data, we estimate a difference-in-differences model of the impact of 
switching from local to national standards in medical malpractice cases on the rate 
by which physicians in the affected regions performs surgeries in both inpatient 
and outpatient settings.  An important factor to note is that the effect of changing 
the local standard depends on whether those standards are initially high or low.  
That is, changing to a national standard calls for more intensive treatment only to 
the extent that the existing local custom is to provide less intensive treatment.  In 
such instances, we effectively ask whether the shift to national standards is 
associated with an increase in practice sensitivity.  This allows us to test whether 
practice intensity rises when the law changes to seek such an outcome.  Similarly, 
the move towards a national standard will represent a decrease in the practice 
intensity expected of physicians in regions whose existing local custom is to 
provide an above-average level of practice intensity.  With respect to these 
regions, we effectively ask whether the adoption of a national standard rule is 
associated with a decrease in practice intensity.  Thus, following Frakes (2013), 
we estimate the extent to which the adoption of national standard rules promotes 
convergence in outcomes—reducing variation across areas so that counties 
become more similar in their surgical proclivities.   
Using a general measure of practice intensity based on the number of total 
surgeries performed in a county extends the analysis of the impact of standards on 
practice style beyond the cardiac and obstetric focus of Frakes (2013).  However, 
this extension does come with some cost.  Focusing on the more general clinical 
setting complicates the choice of denominator to use.  That is, this analysis does 
not capture the simplicity of the obstetric analysis, whereby we may simply model 
the number of cesareans performed out of the subsample of deliveries observed.  
In this obstetric analysis, it is straightforward to model the choice between the 
intensive and the non-intensive-alternative—i.e., between cesarean and vaginal 
delivery—since both can be observed and since the rate of cesarean deliveries out 
of total deliveries necessarily describes both rates.  Finding a metric that fully 
describes the propensity of physicians in a region to choose the intensive surgical 
option over the non-intensive option in a more general setting is more 
challenging.    
                                                 
4 The specific reforms we use include noneconomic damage caps, punitive damage caps, collateral 
source rule reform, joint and several liability reform and caps on attorney contingency fees. 
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One choice for a denominator in this broader setting would be simply to 
examine the number of surgeries per capita.  However, this choice imposes two 
notable concerns.  First, for much of the sample, the county population data is not 
available with precision.  Population counts are linearly interpolated to cover the 
intercensal years.  Second, using the total area population as the denominator in 
the surgery rate calculation is problematic because the change in the liability rule 
may be spuriously correlated with a release of certain access barriers that increase 
the number of physicians servicing the relevant area.  This access relief might 
itself lead to an increase in the number of surgeries and thus an increase in the 
number of surgeries per population.  Since physician access may have improved 
under this hypothesized incident, however, it is possible that the relevant region 
may have experienced an even bigger increase in utilization of the non-intensive 
practice alternative.  In this event, the average utilization intensity for that region 
may have actually declined.  By just normalizing surgery counts by population, 
we may not be able to capture changes in the non-intensive alternative that we 
want in order to form the right utilization rate.   
To address these concerns, we normalize the total surgery counts by the 
number of total physicians practicing in an area.  If we assume, as we do, that 
physicians take either a non-intensive or an intensive—i.e., surgical—practice 
style, then a given increase in the number of physicians in the region should 
increase both intensive and non-intensive treatment in a proportional fashion 
(roughly speaking).  Normalizing the number of surgeries by the total physician 
count reflects this and allows us to focus on changes in clinical practice in an area 
independent of total aggregate treatment.  Stated differently, normalizing the 
number of observed surgeries by the number of physicians in the regions allows 
us to capture the expected practice style of a given physician operating in that 
region, which arguably facilitates a more direct test of the link between liability 
standards and physician practice behavior.5  Moreover, to the extent that the rate 
of surgeries to physicians increases, it implies roughly that surgeries may be rising 
relative to their non-intensive alternative, which is the physician choice we are 
attempting to model with this analysis.  Over the sample period, the data reflect 
roughly 50 surgeries per physician across counties (weighted by county size).      
We implement our approach using the following empirical specification 
(weighted by the size of the county-by-year cell):  
 
(1) 𝑆𝑐,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝜆𝑡 +  𝛿𝑐 +  𝛽1𝑁𝑆𝑐,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐻𝐼𝑐 + 
 𝛽3(𝑁𝑆𝑐,𝑡 × 𝐻𝐼𝑐) +  𝛽4𝑋𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 
 
where c indexes county and t indexes year; NSc,t represents an indicator for a 
national-standard law (which actually evolves on a state-year basis); HIc indicates 
that a county is located in what is initially a high treatment-intensity county6; Xc,t 
                                                 
5 Regardless the findings do not differ substantially when normalizing by population.   
6 Note that the variable HI would drop out of the models with county fixed effects.  Initially low-
intensity (high-intensity) treatment counties are identified by whether the rates of inpatient and 
outpatient surgeries in those counties were below (above) the national mean surgery rate during 
the five year period leading up to the national-standard adoption.  The results are robust to 
alternative classification schemes—e.g., focusing on the first three years of the sample instead.   
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contains additional county-year or state-year factors;7 and year fixed effects, λt, 
control for fixed differences across years.  The term (𝑁𝑆𝑐,𝑡 × 𝐻𝐼𝑐) represents the 
interaction between initially high-intensity areas and the national standard laws. 
State-specific linear time trends are captured by φs,t, which control for slowly-
moving correlations between physician behavior in a state and the adoption of a 
national-standard law.  Note that when we implement (1), we include county fixed 
effects as well (𝛿c) so the 𝐻𝐼𝑐 term drops out.  Surgery rates (as defined above) 
are captured by Sct. 
As above, the predicted effects of national-standard adoptions on the 
proclivities of physicians to treat patients intensively depends on the baseline 
tendencies of the relevant county during the locality-rule regime.  That is, 
national-standard rules are not predicted to increase or decrease surgery rates 
across the board.  Rather, they are predicted to induce convergence in surgery 
rates towards the national norm—i.e., an increase in rates for those areas that start 
below the norm and a decrease in rates for those areas that start above the norm.  
This interaction specification is designed to model this convergence effect.  There 
are two primary coefficients of interest in this specification.  The term 𝛽1 
identifies the extent to which the adoption of a national-standard law is associated 
with a change in surgery rates for those areas that began the sample with initially 
low-intensity practice styles—i.e., those with HI = 0.  The term 𝛽3 identifies how 
the effect of the standard differs in areas that are initially high intensity.  The sum 
𝛽1 + 𝛽3 represents the combined effect of national standards in the initially high 
intensity areas.  In other words, this interaction specification allows us to explore 
the effects of national standard adoptions separately on: (1) those areas with 
initially low practice intensities and with respect to which a national standard 
adoption arguably entails a heightening of the practice intensity expected of 
medical practices and (2) those areas with initially high practice intensities and 
with respect to which a national standard adoption arguably entails a reduction in 
the practice intensity expected of medical practices.   
We test several versions of this model to check for sensitivity and highlight 
different results.  We vary the inclusion of covariates, fixed effects and time 
trends to determine whether other confounders are possibly driving the results.  
We stratify the results according to the population density of the county to 
determine whether the effects vary in urban or rural areas.  We also estimate 
dynamic versions of this model to test for the presence of leads (i.e., pre-existing 
trends) or lags in the effect.  Primarily, we log the dependent variable, so the 
effect of the standard rules (which are dummy variables) can be interpreted in 
percentage terms (among other reasons for the log transformation).  Coefficients 
in the Tables below are multiplied by 100 to facilitate this interpretation in the 
case of the log-transformed specifications.  Also, for all regressions, we produce 
variance estimates that are adjusted to allow for clustering at the state level. 
                                                 
7 These county-by-year characteristics include the percent of the population over age 65, percent 
non-white, percent Hispanic origin, average per-capital household income, the number of hospital 
beds per population, the number of physicians per capita (general and across different specialty 
categories) and the overall population density, as well as dummy indicators for the tort reform 
variables described above and attainment rates for various education categories.   
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On a final note, we focus our primary specifications on those counties that on 
average over the sample period have at least 50 hospital beds.  There are a large 
number of counties within the data that do not have a hospital at all (not 
surprisingly concentrated largely in rural areas).  Many counties have a small 
hospital presence early in the sample period and none later in the sample, likely as 
a result of industry consolidation over the 1980s and 1990s.  Since our goal is to 
evaluate the intensive-versus-non-intensive nature of medical decisionmaking 
within regions and how the practice style followed in an area depends on the 
prevailing malpractice-standard rules—as opposed to how overall surgery levels 
depends on malpractice forces—we choose to condition this analysis on some 
baseline level of supply.  Given some hospital presence itself, the intensive versus 
non-intensive choice within regions becomes a meaningful one that we can 
capture continuously with the data.  To be sure, the decision to abandon a hospital 
presence in a county could be a reflection of a decision among physicians in that 
county to focus more on non-intensive measures.  However, a decision of this 
nature represents a rather discrete jump that is likely to be more driven by 
fundamental market factors than malpractice considerations, complicating the 
empirical exercise.  Nonetheless, we also present results from unrestricted 
specifications that include data from all counties in all years, demonstrating the 
general insensitivity of the results to this sample selection criterion.   
3 Results 
3.1 Convergence Results 
 
In Table 2, we present estimates of specification (1) above, capturing the 
relationship between the adoption of national-standard rules and regional 
convergence in the utilization rates of surgical procedures.  The table allows us to 
determine the association between national-standard rules and surgery rates 
separately for counties that were initially low intensity in nature and counties that 
were initially high intensity in nature.  The different columns report results from 
separate regressions with different combinations of covariates and state-specific 
time trends, as noted in the table.  In the full covariate specification, we include 
controls for prevailing county-year-specific rates of physician concentration rates 
(that is physicians per capita, both total and across various specialties) and 
hospital bed concentration rates (bed counts per capita).  However, since such 
supply outcomes may also be impacted by national-standard reforms, which may 
affect the interpretation of the results, we present results from specifications that 
do not include these supply-focused covariates (we likewise breakout the results 
in this manner in Table 4 discussed below).    
Frakes (2013) showed that in the settings of cardiac care and obstetrics, 
national standard adoptions were associated with regional convergence in practice 
intensities.  In other words, the low intensity areas became more intensive and the 
high intensity areas became less intensive.  In Table 2, we find that this 
relationship holds in the more general setting of all surgical procedures.  As 
demonstrated by the first row in Panel A of Table 2, in the base model with no 
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covariates, a national standards law is associated with an 8.82 percent increase in 
the surgery rate for the initially low intensity areas (capturing 𝛽1 from 
specification (1)).  There is an opposite effect in the initially high intensity areas, 
which can be gathered by summing the base effect (i.e., the coefficient from row 
1) and the coefficient of the interaction term set forth in row 2 (capturing 𝛽3).  
This combined effect suggests that there is a 4.52 percent decrease in surgical 
procedures in the initially high intensity areas.  While this pattern of coefficients 
suggests convergence from both the bottom and the top, neither effect is 
statistically significant at conventional levels in the log-transformed 
specifications.  Both effects, however, are significant at the 1 percent level in the 
non-log-transformed models, as demonstrated by Panel B.  The size and 
significance of these effects generally increase as we add covariates, with the full 
log-transformed model indicating a 16.59 percent increase in the surgery rate in 
the initially low intensity areas and a 9.88 percent decrease in the initially high 
intensity areas (both significant at the 5% level or better).8  Consistent with past 
work, this confirms that national standards promote convergence in clinical 
practices across geographic areas. 
Malpractice scholars have suggested that the sensitivity of practices to 
malpractice pressure differs across geographic areas of varying population 
density.  Matsa (2007) found evidence of greater sensitivity in rural regions and 
argued that it is due to rural physicians facing more uninsured malpractice costs 
and more elastic demand for health care.  There are other reasons beyond Matsa’s 
general claims to consider the effect of standard-of-care laws on rural and urban 
areas separately.  Much of the historical discussion surrounding the need for the 
locality rule emphasized its rationale within rural areas – suggesting, for example, 
that it might be impractical to expect rural physicians to follow practice styles 
elsewhere.  Inherent in such discussions is the notion that retreats from locality 
rules may be most impactful in rural regions.  Moreover, one might presume that 
practices in urban areas are heavily shaped by so many influences - competitive 
forces, information networks, etc. – that arguably may be more attenuated in rural 
environments.  If this is the case, physicians in rural regions may place greater 
weight on whatever signals are provided via the malpractice system regarding 
proper clinical practices (liability fears themselves aside).  Altogether, these 
different factors suggest that we would expect the impact of a switch to national 
standards to be more pronounced in rural areas. 
  
                                                 
8 In separate, unreported regressions, we estimate an alternative interaction specification in which 
the coefficient of the national-standard dummy can be interpreted as the effect of national standard 
laws for the initially high-intensity areas.  This alternative specification allows for a more direct 
test of the statistical significance of the combined effects from Table 2.  This alternative approach 
confirms the statistical significance of this combined effect. 
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Table 2.  Relationship between National-Standard Laws and the Rate of Inpatient 
and Outpatient Surgical Procedures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A.  Log transformation of dependent variable (setting surgery counts = 1 in zero-surgery 
counties) 
National-Standard (NS)  
     Law Dummy 
8.82 
(7.05) 
11.02* 
(5.82) 
11.27    
(6.82) 
12.65 
(7.97) 
16.59** 
(6.56) 
NS Law * Above- 
     Average Intensity  
     County  
-13.34 
(8.05) 
-19.53***   
(7.22) 
-19.27** 
(7.79) 
-19.51** 
 (8.92) 
-26.47*** 
(9.77) 
Panel B.  No log transformation of dependent variable 
National-Standard (NS)  
     Law Dummy 
8.87*** 
(3.01) 
9.71*** 
(2.93) 
10.54*** 
(3.60) 
11.03***    
(4.10) 
10.17***    
(2.97) 
NS Law * Above- 
     Average Intensity  
     County  
-18.46*** 
(5.13) 
-19.70*** 
(4.79) 
-15.68*** 
(4.20) 
-15.90*** 
(4.64) 
-20.67*** 
(4.77) 
          N 49,645 49,645 49,645 49,645 49,645 
County-Year Covariates NO YES YES YES YES 
Covariate Tort Reforms NO NO YES YES YES 
County-Year Physician  
     Concentration Rates  
     and Bed Count Rates 
NO NO NO YES YES 
State-Specific Linear    
     Time Trends 
NO NO NO NO YES 
Note: Table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of national standards laws on the use 
of inpatient and outpatient surgical procedures per capita, in logs (Panel A) and levels (Panel B).  Coefficients 
are multiplied by 100 in Panel A.  Regressions include county and year fixed effects.  Data are at the county-
year level.  An above-average county is defined as a county that initially had higher than average utilization of 
inpatient and outpatient surgical procedures (coefficient dropped with inclusion of county fixed effects).  
County-year covariates include the percent of the population over age 65, percent non-white, percent Hispanic 
origin, average per-capital household income, and the population density.  Regressions are weighted by the 
size of the relevant county-year cell.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, adjusted to allow for 
correlation (clustering) at the state level.  A *, ** or ***, indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5% or 
1% level, respectively.   
 
 
To test this, we follow Matsa and estimate the treatment intensity convergence 
regressions with the full set of covariates (corresponding to Column 5 in Table 2) 
for counties in each quartile of population density.  We report these results in 
Table 3.  Each column reports the results of a separate regression of counties by 
density quartile.9  Generally, the findings appear to support the notion that 
standards are more binding in rural areas.  The results across population density 
quartiles are generally similar to the overall results, with two-sided convergence 
evident in most (but not all) cases.  However, the relationship is most pronounced 
in rural counties, with national standards being associated with a 29.08 percent 
increase in the surgery rate in initially low intensity counties and a 25.27 percent 
                                                 
9 Note that the imbalance in the number of observations across the four quartiles is due to the fact 
that a substantial number of counties in rural regions either have no hospitals consistently over the 
entire duration of the sample or a small number of hospital beds on average over the sample period 
and are thus excluded according to the sample selection criteria set forth above (with many of such 
zero-hospital observations simply being dropped by the natural logging of the outcome variables 
anyway).   
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decrease in the initially high intensity counties.  These effects are more than twice 
in magnitude than in any other population density category.  Interestingly, the 
effect does not appear to be monotonic in population size, as there is no clear 
relationship between population size and the effect of standards across the other 
three population density quartiles.  
 
Table 3.  Relationship between National-Standard Laws and the Rate of Inpatient 
and Outpatient Surgical Procedures (Logged), By Population Density 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
1ST 
POPULATION 
DENSITY 
QUARTILE 
(RURAL) 
2ND 
POPULATION 
DENSITY 
QUARTILE 
3RD 
POPULATION 
DENSITY 
QUARTILE 
4TH 
POPULATION 
DENSITY 
QUARTILE 
(URBAN) 
National-Standard (NS)  
     Law Dummy 
29.08 
(22.31) 
5.75 
(30.51) 
-2.25 
(22.79) 
13.45 
(10.19) 
NS Law * Above- 
     Average Intensity  
     County 
-54.35* 
(31.57) 
-28.85 
(21.18) 
-5.79 
(25.66) 
-19.88* 
(10.49) 
          N 5,619 9,050 14,052 20,924 
Note: Table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of national standards laws on 
the use of inpatient and outpatient surgical procedures according to population density.  Coefficients are 
multiplied by 100.  Data are at the county-year level.  An above-average county is defined as a county 
that initially had higher than average utilization of inpatient and outpatient surgical procedures 
(coefficient dropped with inclusion of county fixed effects).  Population density is defined according to 
the county-level distribution across all sample years.  Regressions also include county and year fixed 
effects, as well as county-year controls for the percent of the population over age 65, percent non-white, 
percent Hispanic origin, average per-capital household income, the number of hospital beds and 
physicians per population and the population density.  Regressions also include a set of state-specific 
linear time trends.  Regressions are weighted by the size of the relevant county-year cell.  Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses, adjusted to allow for correlation (clustering) at the state 
level.  A *, ** or ***, indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively.   
 
 
With any difference in differences analysis, one is concerned that the 
differential in the relevant utilization rates between treatment and control groups 
is actually due to some pre-existing trend which emerges before the reform.  To 
explore for such differential pre-period trends, we re-estimate the model including 
several lead variables for the national standard law.  If there is a differential pre-
existing trend in states that adopt a national standard rule, we would expect the 
coefficient on these lead variables to be significant.  In addition, to test for any 
dynamic changes in the relationship between standards and surgery rates we 
include lags terms as well.  Given the interactions between standards and the 
initial level of intensity we employ in our main analysis, we simplify this dynamic 
exercise by breaking the analysis into two samples: initially below-average 
surgical intensity counties and initially above-average surgical intensity counties.   
We present the results of this dynamic specification in both tabular and 
graphical forms.  Across the columns in Table 4, we estimate the leads and lags 
specifications sequentially adding additional covariates, with Panel A capturing 
the effect of national-standard adoptions for initially below average counties and  
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Table 4.  Relationship between National-Standard Laws and the Rate of Inpatient 
and Outpatient Surgical Procedures (Logged), Dynamic Specifications Separately 
for Initially Above- and Below-Average Intensity Areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Panel A: Initially Below-Average Surgical Intensity Counties (operationalized by dropping 
treatment counties that are of initially above-average surgical intensity) 
Coefficient of  National-
Standard Law Dummy 
    
4-Year Lead Dummy 
-4.11 
(5.05) 
-3.84 
(4.65) 
-3.83 
(4.67) 
-0.41 
(4.96) 
2-Year Lead Dummy 
-0.03 
(1.20) 
0.59 
(1.32) 
0.34 
(1.28) 
0.20 
(1.35) 
Contemporaneous 
Dummy 
9.03 
(5.84) 
11.17** 
(5.28) 
10.47* 
(5.90) 
10.97 
(6.57) 
2-Year Lag Dummy 
0.83 
(1.32) 
0.72 
(1.12) 
0.44 
(1.31) 
-0.15 
(1.42) 
4-Year Lag Dummy 
0.60 
(3.02) 
-0.17 
(3.03) 
0.01 
(3.40) 
0.64 
(3.53) 
     N 40,703 40,703 40,703 40,703 
Panel B: Initially Above-Average Surgical Intensity Counties (operationalized by dropping 
treatment counties that are of initially below-average surgical intensity) 
4-Year Lead Dummy 
2.34* 
(1.40) 
1.93 
(1.70) 
0.28 
(2.44) 
1.53 
(2.59) 
2-Year Lead Dummy 
0.60 
(1.36) 
0.21 
(1.45) 
0.80 
(1.55) 
0.77 
(1.66) 
Contemporaneous 
Dummy 
-3.22 
(2.18) 
-4.51* 
(2.45) 
-3.95 
(2.61) 
-3.82 
(2.81) 
2-Year Lag Dummy 
-1.59 
(1.11) 
-2.32** 
(0.97) 
-2.06** 
(0.96) 
-2.21** 
(0.88) 
4-Year Lag Dummy 
-1.72 
(2.35) 
-3.41 
(2.32) 
-2.98 
(2.42) 
-2.44 
(2.51) 
     N 47,042 47,042 47,042 47,042 
County-Year Covariates NO YES YES YES 
Covariate Tort Reforms NO NO YES YES 
County-Year Physician  
     Concentration Rates  
     and Bed Count Rates 
NO NO NO YES 
Note: Table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of national standards laws on 
the use of inpatient and outpatient surgical procedures, including lag and lead terms on the standards to 
test for the presence of pre-existing trends in surgery utilization that predict the adoption of national 
standards laws.  Coefficients are multiplied by 100.  Data are at the county-year level.  Regressions 
include county and year fixed effects.  An above-average county is defined as a county that initially had 
higher than average utilization of inpatient and outpatient surgical procedures (coefficients dropped 
with inclusion of county fixed effects).  County-year covariates include the percent of the population 
over age 65, percent non-white, percent Hispanic origin, average per-capital household income, and the 
population density.  Given no evidence of pre-treatment trends, we elect not to estimate specifications 
that impose state-specific linear trends in these dynamic results.  Regressions also include a set of state-
specific linear time trends.  Regressions are weighted by the size of the relevant county-year cell.  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, adjusted to allow for correlation (clustering) at the 
state level.  A *, ** or ***, indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. 
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Panel B for initially above-average counties.  Note that we specify the four-year 
lead coefficient as turning from 0 to 1 four years prior to the national-standard-law 
adoption in the relevant state and staying at 1 thereafter.  The other lead and lag 
variables are specified accordingly.  With this specification, the coefficient of the 
4-year lead coefficient captures the differential in surgery rates between treatment 
and control counties in the period of time between the two- and four-year period 
prior to a national-standard adoption and the years prior to that period.  The 
coefficient of the two-year lead variable then captures the subsequent change in 
this differential as we move into the period marked by the two years prior to the 
national-standard adoption—i.e., the differential surgery rate between treatment 
and control states in the two-year-prior period relative to the two-to-four-year-
prior period—and so on.  To capture the cumulative time trend in the differential 
surgery rate between treatment and control states—with time entailing years prior 
to and subsequent to national-standard adoptions—one naturally adds up these 
subsequent coefficient levels.  In Figures 1 and 2, we plot this cumulative time-
trend differential, focusing on those specifications that include the full set of 
controls, with Figure 1 focusing on the initially-below-average surgical intensity 
counties and Figure 2 focusing on the initially-above-average intensity counties.  
Effectively, these figures allow us to trace out the effects of national standard 
adoptions on surgery rates over time. 
 
 
   
Notes: this figure plots the cumulative effects of national-standard adoptions over time in initially low intensity 
counties and is derived from the coefficients reported in Column 4 , Panel A of Table 4.  The time marked by -4 
in the figure represents the reference period for this trend and signifies the period of time that ends at the point 
that is four years prior to the adoption of a national standard law—i.e., capturing all earlier years. The level of 
this reported time trend at the time mark of -2 represents the subsequent change (beyond this reference point) in 
the differential surgery rate between treatment and control counties as one moves into the period that is between 
two and four years prior to the adoption of a national standard.  Likewise, the level of the trend at the time mark 
of 0 represents the degree to which this differential surgery rate in the period of time between 0-2 years prior to 
adoption differs from the differential surgery rate during the reference period, and so on.   
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Figure 1: Impact of National Standard Rule on Surgery 
Rates (Logged) among Initially Low Surgery Counties
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Our results are encouraging and support the validity of our approach.  
Importantly, there is no evidence of a pre-existing trend that could generate our 
main results.  Only one of the 16 different lead terms in Table 4 is statistically 
significant at even the 10% level, and it has the opposite sign as predicted (it 
indicates a positive trend in the high intensity areas).  There appears to be some 
evidence of a lag in the effect in high intensity counties, though the 
contemporaneous dummy consistently has the largest effect.10   
 
 
Notes: this figure plots the cumulative effects of national-standard adoptions over time in initially high intensity 
counties and is derived from the coefficients reported in Column 4 , Panel B of Table 4.  The figure is otherwise 
structured in accordance with the approach taken in Figure 1.   
 
3.2 Robustness Exercises 
 
In Table 5, we replicate the full-covariates specification from Table 2 (Column 
5), while subjecting the analysis to varying sample selection criteria.  For the 
reasons set forth above, in our primary specifications, we confine the sample to 
those counties that have a mean number of hospital beds over the sample period of 
at least 50.  As stated before, a notable number of county-year cells in the sample 
do not have hospitals at all, with counties sometimes having dropped hospitals 
over the sample period, leading to the potential for discrete jumps towards 0 in 
surgery rates for some counties over time.  As demonstrated by Table 5, this 
sample-selection choice appears to be of little significance, as the basic pattern of 
results is largely insensitive to the choice of other cutoffs (e.g., 25, 75 and 100 
beds) or to the imposition of any criterion at all (Column 1).  The results also do 
not change substantially when we drop zero-surgery cells via the log 
                                                 
10 In Table 4, we do not actually fully separate all counties into initially high and initially low 
counties.  Rather, we do this only for treatment counties, effectively keeping all control counties as 
viable controls for both panels.  The results, however, are robust to an alternative approach that 
fully separates counties based on initial intensity classification.  We elect primary specification 
given the choice (discussed above) to define initially high intensity and initially low intensity with 
reference to the years leading up to the adoptions of national standard laws themselves.  
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
D
if
fe
re
n
ti
al
 T
im
e 
T
re
n
d
 i
n
 S
u
rg
er
y
 R
at
es
 
b
et
w
ee
n
 T
re
at
m
en
t 
an
d
 C
o
n
tr
o
l 
C
o
u
n
ti
es
 (
as
 
a 
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
M
ea
n
 S
u
rg
er
y
 R
at
e)
Time (Years Prior to and Subsequent to National Standard Adoption)
Figure 2: Impact of National Standard Rule on Surgery 
Rates (Logged) among Initially High Surgery Counties 
16 
transformation of the surgery rate (Panel A), as opposed to including such cells 
and replacing zero-surgery counts with a surgery count of 1 before log 
transforming (Panel B, the primary approach utilized above).  In Panel C, we 
show the results across the various sample-selection cutoffs with specifications 
that do not log-transform the dependent variable.  We find comparable results in 
all such instances.11 
 
 
Table 5.  Robustness Checks: Alternative Sample-Selection Criteria and 
Treatment of Zero Cells 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
NO SAMPLE 
RESTRICTIONS 
RESTRICTED 
TO MEAN 
BED COUNT 
OF AT LEAST 
25 
RESTRICTED 
TO MEAN 
BED COUNT 
OF AT LEAST 
50 
RESTRICTED 
TO MEAN 
BED COUNT 
OF AT LEAST 
75 
RESTRICTED 
TO MEAN 
BED COUNT 
OF AT LEAST 
100 
Panel A: Log transformation of surgery rates, thus dropping cells with zero surgeries  
National-Standard (NS)  
     Law Dummy 
9.28* 
(5.03) 
10.26** 
(5.09) 
10.73** 
(5.12) 
12.21** 
(5.02) 
-11.57** 
(5.06) 
NS Law * Above- 
     Average Intensity  
     County  
-18.14** 
(7.46) 
-19.00** 
(7.54) 
-18.55** 
(7.38) 
-19.24*** 
(6.4) 
-17.40*** 
(5.88) 
          N 61333 59437 48801 39515 33250 
Panel B: Replace number of surgeries equal to 1 for zero-surgery cells before log transforming surgery 
rates (Primary Approach) 
National-Standard (NS)  
     Law Dummy 
6.46 
(5.76) 
13.87* 
(7.30) 
16.59** 
(6.56) 
17.34** 
(6.67) 
18.07** 
(7.89) 
NS Law * Above- 
     Average Intensity  
     County  
-15.21 
(10.12) 
-25.27** 
(12.30) 
-26.47*** 
(9.77) 
-27.26*** 
(9.08) 
-26.13** 
(9.75) 
          N 72807 61335 49645 39963 33552 
Panel C: No log transformation of surgery rate 
National-Standard (NS)  
     Law Dummy 
7.59*** 
(1.92)  
9.33***   
(2.55) 
10.18*** 
(2.97) 
10.20*** 
(3.42) 
8.82*** 
(3.18) 
NS Law * Above- 
     Average Intensity  
     County  
-18.64*** 
(4.69) 
-20.47*** 
 (4.58) 
-20.67*** 
(4.78) 
-20.44*** 
(4.84) 
-17.48***   
(4.42) 
          N 72807 61335 49645 39963 33552 
Note: Table replicates the specification estimated in Column 5 of Table 2, but subject to the indicated 
modification.  Coefficients are multiplied by 100 in Panels A and B.  Columns 2-5 restrict the sample to those 
counties that have a mean number of inpatient beds over the sample period of the indicated amount.  Column 1 
presents results from specifications with no such restrictions.  A *, ** or ***, indicates statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively.   
 
 
Finally, we address one concern stemming from Medicare’s implementation of 
the Prospective Payment System (PPS) in October, 1983, which broadly shifted 
                                                 
11 Only in the case of Column 1 of Panel B (which involves no sample selection criteria and which 
log transforms the dependent variable while imposing a surgery count of 1 in the zero-surgery 
counties) do we find statistically insignificant results.  While the point estimates in this 
specification are slightly lower, we nonetheless find the same pattern of convergence.     
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hospital reimbursement from a full-cost system to a casemix-adjusted flat-rate 
system.  Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) demonstrate that this implementation 
increased hospital capital-to-labor ratios.  Counties may have felt varied effects of 
the PPS implementation system given different pre-PPS Medicare exposures.  
While there is no reason to believe that any such differential Medicare exposure 
across counties is related to state national-standard rule adoptions, one may be 
concerned that a spurious correlation could confound the analysis, at least with 
respect to the estimated impacts of national-standard adoptions in initially low 
intensity counties, which may also be expected to experience increased capital-
labor ratios upon national-standard adoptions (one may be less concerned that 
PPS implementation could explain the reductions in intensity associated with the 
initially high intensity regions).  To first address this concern, we estimate the 
full-covariates specification from Table 2 (Column 5) but exclude the 1982-1985 
period—i.e., the window around the implementation of PPS.  In this specification, 
the estimated coefficient of the national standard dummy, capturing the effect of 
national-standard rules in initially low-intensity regions, increases slightly from 
16.59 to 19.34 (still significant at 5 percent).  This leaves us with greater 
confidence that the main findings above are not simply attributable to the 
confounding influence of PPS.  Likewise, the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction term remains nearly unchanged at -29.62 (relative to a baseline of -
26.47, likewise still significant at 1 percent).      
4 Conclusion 
Using data on surgery counts at the county-by-year level, we present evidence of 
regional convergence in broadly-specified surgical intervention rates—that is, 
initially low-intensity counties increasing their surgery rates and initially high-
intensity counties decreasing their surgery rates—upon the abandonments of rules 
holding physicians to the standards of care applied in their locality and the 
contemporaneous adoption of rules requiring that physicians follow national-
standards of care.  Supplementing Frakes (2013), these results suggest that greater 
geographic standardization of medical liability rules are associated with greater 
geographical standardization in practices, which in turn is broadly suggestive of 
the empirical relevance of medical liability standards in the first instance. 
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